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LITIGATION AND DELAY AT
GUANTÁNAMO BAY
Marc D. Falkoff*
For academics, Guantánamo is an intellectual feast.  Thanks to
the administration’s decision to detain suspected terrorists in the
supposedly lawless void of an offshore prison camp, we have been
busy for years debating fundamental issues concerning the extra-
territorial reach of the Constitution,1 the office of “the Great
Writ,”2 the powers of the executive during wartime,3 and even the
definition of “war” itself.4  For those of us who still believe our na-
tion can serve as a beacon of human rights for the world, these
scholarly questions are a live and pressing concern, not least be-
cause they are susceptible to no easy answers.  In forums like this
one, we accordingly exercise our solemn duty to wrestle with big
ideas, so that we may police our judges and elected officials to as-
sure they maintain their intellectual honesty.
But Guantánamo Bay is more than just a marker for a tangle
of competing legal theories.  Today, Guantánamo remains home to
nearly 400 prisoners, none of whom have been convicted of any-
thing and only ten of whom have even been charged with a crime.5
* Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law.  J.D., Columbia
Law School; Ph.D., Brandeis University; M.A., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;
B.A., University of Pennsylvania.  Since June 2004, the Author has represented seven-
teen Yemeni nationals being detained by the U.S. military at the Guantánamo Bay
Naval Base.
1 See, e.g., Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government Theory of
Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637 (2007); Elizabeth A. Wilson,
The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge”: Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the
Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guantánamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
165 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantánamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Be-
yond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017 (2005).
2 See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in
Detentions at Guantánamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 127 (2006); James E.
Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 497 (2006).
3 See, e.g., JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER (Simon & Schuster 2006); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND
THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY
(New Press 2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism
and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004).
4 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639
(2002); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002).
5 Not long after the instant symposium took place, Australian David Hicks
pleaded guilty before a military commission to a single count of providing material
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Most of these men, including more than a dozen of my Yemeni
clients, have been held at Guantánamo for more than five years—
sleeping on steel beds, cut off entirely from their families, deprived
of intellectual stimulation, slowing growing insane.  They have
been abused, religiously humiliated, and denied absolutely their
day in court.  Their condition is, in a word, pitiful.
As a practitioner and an academic, I live uneasily with a dual
consciousness about Guantánamo.  At times I will be absorbed in
debates about the scope of the common-law writ of habeas corpus
or about what Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in United States v.
Verdugo–Urquidez6 might mean for the development of Supreme
Court doctrine for overseas detention cases.  But then I receive a
letter from one of my clients or pay a visit to Guantánamo, and I
find myself confronted again, in an unmediated way, with the de-
spair and hopelessness to which many of my clients have
succumbed.
I spent this morning exchanging e-mails with lawyers from the
Department of Justice, seeking permission to bring a psychiatrist
on my next trip down to Guantánamo. A colleague was recently at
the prison camp and met with one of our clients, Adnan, who has
been on a hunger strike for nearly two months.7  According to our
heartbreaking interview notes, Adnan is now “[i]ncredibly thin.
Looks incredibly weak & broken. Says too weak to speak with us.
Horrible.”8  Apparently he also bore new scars on his wrist, indicat-
ing that he had recently attempted suicide.  I explained to the Jus-
support to a terrorist organization.  According to news accounts, the terms of Hicks’
extraordinary plea include that he will serve his sentence in Australia; he will serve no
more than nine months; he will not sue the United States government for torture or
other abusive treatment; and he will not speak to the media for a full year after his
release. See William Glaberson, Australian to Serve Nine Months in Terrorism Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A10.
6 U. S. v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing the “fundamental rights” of non-citizens abroad).
7 The protective order under which the Guantánamo habeas lawyers work re-
quires us to treat as “classified” all information learned from our clients, since any-
thing they tell us supposedly represents a national security threat.  All information
discussed herein has been cleared for public consumption by a Department of De-
fense “privilege review team.”
8 Adnan has been on hunger strikes in the past, but only for relatively short peri-
ods.  Like many of the prisoners at Guantánamo, he spends a good deal of time com-
posing poetry and has drafted several poems discussing the many hunger strikes that
have taken place inside the wire.  One of his poems is included in a volume of poetry
published in August 2007. See POEMS FROM GUANTÁNAMO: THE DETAINEES SPEAK
(Marc Falkoff ed., U. Iowa Press 2007); see also Marc Falkoff, Verses of Suffering, AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL MAGAZINE (Fall 2007) (cover story discussing Adnan’s psycho-
logical deterioration).
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tice Department lawyers that Adnan had longstanding
psychological problems, probably stemming from the same head
injury (suffered in a motor vehicle accident) that had led him from
Yemen to Afghanistan to seek cheap medical care in 2001.  I also
explained that Adnan might be delusional and that he was refusing
to take anti-psychotic medication because he believed the prison
psychiatrist “had been complicit in torture” and therefore could
not be trusted.9  Under these circumstances, I urged, a visit from a
psychiatrist of our choosing—someone who might convince Adnan
to take his medication and, perhaps, abandon his hunger strike—
was vital to keeping him alive.  The Justice Department denied our
plea, along with our request for Adnan’s medical records.  So we
have started drafting a motion to compel a psychiatrist’s visit—a
motion that we expect will be denied.
That is a typical day in the Guantánamo litigation.  Notwith-
standing our repeated victories in the Supreme Court, the govern-
ment will concede nothing to us.  More than two years ago, we
learned from a New York Times article that the military was consider-
ing the transfer of more than half of the Guantánamo population
to prisons in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Yemen.10  When we
inquired how much notice the Justice Department would provide
us before our clients were transferred off the island, we were told
we would receive no advance warning.  The prospect of an unno-
ticed, dead-of-night transfer for indefinite detention in another
country, coupled with the very real prospect that our clients might
9 Perhaps Adnan’s distrust of Guantánamo medical personnel is not unreasona-
ble.  The military’s position is that the prisoners have no confidential relationship
with the doctors at Guantánamo.  Therefore, patient records may be used to facilitate
interrogations. See Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005, at 63, avail-
able at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/11/050711fa_fact4.  In June
2005, the American Psychiatric Association issued a statement indicating that the or-
ganization was “troubled” by “alleged violations of professional medical ethics by psy-
chiatrists at Guantánamo Bay.”  News Release, Am. Psychiatric Assoc., APA Statement
on Psychiatric Practices at Guantánamo Bay 1 (June 27, 2005), available at http://
www.psych.org/news_room/press_releases/05-40psychpracticeguantanamo.pdf. At
about the same time, the American Psychological Association similarly found it neces-
sary to advise its members that psychologists have an ethical obligation to be alert to
and report any acts of torture or cruel or inhuman treatment to appropriate authori-
ties. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIA-
TION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 4
(June 2005), available at http://www.apa.org/releases/PENSTaskForceReportFinal.
pdf.
10 See Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks to Shift Inmates from Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2005 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/11/politics/11detain.
html?8bl.
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just as easily be rendered to another country to be tortured,11 led
us to file an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order
(TRO).  The TRO was granted, along with a preliminary injunction
shortly thereafter, requiring the government to provide us with
thirty days’ notice before it transfers our clients anywhere.12  That
represented an awful lot of work just to force the government to
tell us when it planned to move our clients out of the jurisdiction
of a federal court in which a live case was pending.
My point is simply that Guantánamo exists today as more than
a legal abstraction.  Some day the prison will be closed and the
term “Guantánamo” will be reduced to little more than a cultural
signifier, evoking the same kind of national shame that we feel
upon hearing about Fred Korematsu and our Japanese American
internment camps in World War II.13  And, doubtless, the conge-
ries of “terror” cases will, in the aggregate, spell out some enduring
conception of executive power in wartime.14  But for the present, it
is important to remember that these cases are still being played out
on the ground, with hundreds of young men well into their sixth
year of detention without charge or trial, their only opportunity to
11 See Ken Silverstein, Pentagon Memo on Torture-Motivated Transfer Cited, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2005 at A10.
12 In granting the preliminary injunction, District Judge Henry H. Kennedy was
dismissive of the government’s claim that the Guantánamo prisoners were seeking to
“veto the same repatriation that they previously told the Court Respondents were re-
quired to conduct.” Abdah v. Bush, No. 04–1254 (HHK), 2005 WL 711814, at *4 n.3
(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005).  Judge Kennedy called the government’s contention “per-
plexing,” because “it seems beyond question that advocating for release into freedom
is not equivalent to advocating for transfer from one ongoing detention in one locale
to ongoing detention in another.” Id.
13 See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  In 1993, President Clinton apolo-
gized to Fred Korematsu for the Japanese American internments, evacuations, and
relocations, stating that, “[i]n retrospect, we understand that the nation’s actions
were rooted deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political leader-
ship.”  Letter from Bill Clinton to Fred Korematsu (Oct. 1, 1993), available at www.
landmarkcases.org/korematsu/letterofapology.html.  In January 2004, Korematsu
filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in support of the Guantánamo petition-
ers’ habeas claims. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petition-
ers, Rasul v. Bush, et al., 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334 & 03-343), 2004 WL
103832.
14 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (stating that “a state of war is
not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citi-
zens.”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).  Of course, more cases are in
the pipeline, including those of my clients, who are part of the Al Odah v. United States
and Boumediene v. Bush matters. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478  (2007)
(Stevens, J.) (concurring in denial of certiorari to review appellate court’s holding
that Military Commissions Act stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction, but sug-
gesting that review of constitutional questions would be appropriate after petitioners
exhausted the remedies provided by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act).
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protest their innocence coming at cobbled-together tribunals con-
vened years after their detention began.
I will briefly describe these tribunals (the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals or (CSRTs)) because the government’s conten-
tion is that a Guantánamo prisoner may be held in prison for life
based solely on a CSRT panel’s determination that the prisoner is
an “enemy combatant.”15  Under the CSRT’s rules, the prisoner is
15 What exactly is an “enemy combatant?”  The term has a sparse legal pedigree
and is unknown to international law. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950) (referring to “enemy aliens” without any discussion or analysis of the term); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 12 (1942) (distinguishing unlawful from lawful combatants,
and noting that the definition of “unlawful combatant” could include “an enemy com-
batant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of wag-
ing war by destruction of life or property.”).  Moreover, the Bush administration itself
has not settled on a definition.  As Justice O’Connor explained in Hamdi, the govern-
ment “has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying
individuals as such,” and therefore the “permissible bounds of the category will be
defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them.”  542 U.S. at
516, 522 n.1.  In Hamdi, the definition of an enemy combatant accepted by the Court
was a person “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States.” Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This definition is much nar-
rower than that suggested by President Bush in November 2001, when he issued an
executive order making any person subject to trial by a military tribunal if the Presi-
dent determines that the person “is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaeda” or “knowingly harbored” an al Qaeda member.  Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 2(a)(1), 66 Fed. Reg.
57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  The Hamdi definition of an “enemy combatant” is also far
narrower than that set forth by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in July
2004 when, less than two weeks after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, he issued the order creating CSRTs.  The Wolfowitz order defines an “enemy
combatant” as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”  Paul Wolfowitz,
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 1 (July 7, 2004), http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; see also Gordon England,
Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Com-
batants Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Encl. (1) at 3 (July 29, 2004)
(Memorandum to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’t, et al., adopting same definition with
respect to revised CSRT procedures).  Under the Wolfowitz definition, the govern-
ment, responding to hypotheticals posed by the district court during hearings for
Guantánamo detainees, asserted that “a person who teaches English to the son of an
al Qaeda member” and a “little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she
thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan” would both be subject to deten-
tion as “enemy combatants.” In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,
475 (D.D.C. 2005).  Congress has subsequently defined an “unlawful enemy combat-
ant” as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-bel-
ligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who
is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or  (ii) a person
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presumed guilty, having already “been determined to be an enemy
combatant through multiple layers of review by officers of the De-
partment of Defense.”16  The prisoner is not entitled to the assis-
tance of a lawyer and may instead rely only on a “personal
representative” from the military—a person who by regulation may
not be a lawyer, with whom the prisoner may not share a confiden-
tial relationship, and who must report any inculpatory statements
from the prisoner to the tribunal.17  The prisoner is not allowed to
see any of the classified evidence against him.  Having never seen
the witness statements, of course, the prisoner cannot seek to con-
trovert them on the grounds that they are untrustworthy hearsay—
or even that they were derived from abuse or torture.
Hearings conducted under such rules turned out to be, as pre-
dicted, a mockery of justice.  Take, for example, the CSRT of one
of my clients, Farouk Ali Ahmed.  Farouk is a young Yemeni man
who, upon graduating from high school in 1999, made a vow to
God that if he successfully memorized the Qur’an, he would spend
a year in Afghanistan teaching the holy text to poor children.  Fa-
rouk memorized the Qur’an and fulfilled his pledge:  He traveled
to Afghanistan to teach and found himself in the country when the
United States bombing campaign against the Taliban began.  Fa-
rouk sought to escape Afghanistan by crossing the border to Paki-
stan, but after passing through the border town of Khost, he—
along with at least thirty other Arabs seeking to do the same—was
taken into custody by Pakistani armed forces and turned over to
who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006 [enacted Oct. 17, 2006], has been determined to
be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of
the President or the Secretary of Defense.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 948a(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
16 Paul Wolfowitz, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 1 (July
7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; see also
Defense Department Background Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040707–0981.
html.  New rules, differing in no material respect in relation to the issues discussed in
the accompanying text, were promulgated following Congress’s passage of the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–48, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005). See Gordon
England, supra note 15.
17 See Gordon England, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Pro-
cedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (July
29, 2004), Encl. 1 ¶ C3 (personal representative “shall not be a judge advocate”); id.
at Encl. 3 ¶ C1 (personal representative “shall explain to the detainee that no confi-
dential relationship exists or may be formed” between them); id. at Encl. 3 ¶ D (per-
sonal representative directed to tell prisoner, “None of the information you provide
me shall be held in confidence and I may be obligated to divulge it at the hearing.”).
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the Americans for a bounty.18
He was brought to Guantánamo in January 2002 and had his
CSRT in October 2004.  Athough I was his lawyer, I was not allowed
to attend the hearing.  Farouk did his best to answer the Tribunal’s
questions, but ultimately he was helpless in responding to the only
evidence against him—an assertion from an anonymous Guantá-
namo prisoner that he had seen Farouk “carrying an AK-47 and
wearing fatigues at UBL’s private airport.”  The paucity of the evi-
dence and its suspect quality led Farouk’s personal representative
to offer an unusual written statement to the CSRT panel, after it
determined that he was properly labeled an “enemy combatant:”
I do not believe that that panel gave full weight to the exhibits
regarding [the witness’s] truthfulness regarding the time frames
in which he saw various other [Guantánamo prisoners] in Af-
ghanistan.  It is unfortunate that the [report] in question was so
heavily redacted that the Tribunal could not see that while [the
witness] may have been a couple of months off in his recollec-
tion of [Farouk’s] appearance with an AK 47, that he was six
months to a year off in his recollections of other Yemeni detain-
ees he identified.  I do feel with some certainty that [the wit-
ness] has lied about other detainees to receive preferable
treatment and to cause them problems while in custody.
Had the Tribunal taken this evidence out as unreliable,
then the position we have taken is that a teacher of the Koran
(to the Taliban’s children) is an enemy combatant (partly be-
cause he slept under a Taliban roof).19
Farouk remains in Guantánamo today.20
Another of my clients, Abd al Malik Abd al Wahab, was ques-
tioned at his CSRT hearing about accusations that he had been
observed at an Al Qaeda “guesthouse” and that he was “frequently
18 British historian Andy Worthington has published an analysis of government
records, released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, that relate to the cap-
ture and detention of Guantánamo prisoners. Among his many interesting findings is
that, after the American bombing campaign at Tora Bora, all persons in the area tried
to escape from danger by following one of two routes—north through the White
Mountains or south through Khost.  The Americans, believing that al Qaeda soldiers
were fleeing south, concentrated their attacks on the Khost route.  In fact, the al
Qaeda leadership had chosen to flee via the White Mountains and escaped capture
altogether. See ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774
DETAINEES IN AMERICA’S ILLEGAL PRISON 20, 40–48 (Pluto Press, 2007).
19 Personal Representative Comments Regarding the Record of Proceedings, ISN
[redacted] (n.d.) (on file with the author).
20 A full account of Farouk Ali Ahmed’s case can be found in a series of articles in
the National Journal. See Corine Hegland, Empty Evidence, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 28;
Corine Hegland, Who Is at Guantánamo Bay, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 33; Corine
Hegland, Guantánamo’s Grip, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 20.
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seen” with Osama bin Laden.  Here is part of his exchange with the
Tribunal President:
Detainee: Regarding [the charge that] I worked at various gues-
thouses and offices.  What was the work?
Tribunal President: I cannot answer that.  This is the first time
we have seen this evidence.  I know nothing more than what is
written here.
Detainee:  The same with me.  I don’t know anything about this.
I had a house that the Taliban gave me to live in with my wife,
that’s it. . . . Regarding [the charge that I was] frequently seen at
[O]sama Bin Ladin’s side.  Who saw me?
Tribunal President:  I do not know.
Detainee: If it says, was frequently seen, you have to prove that.
I am aware of the laws and the courts.  This is the first time I
have been in prison and the first time in a court like this.  And I
know that the accused is innocent until proven guilty.  You have
to come up with the proof.  Regarding, also, the detainee at-
tended various other training camps and resided at a Kandahar,
Afghanistan guesthouse.  What training camps?
Tribunal President: Did you attend any training camps while
you were in Afghanistan?
Detainee: Never.
Tribunal President: Then that answers the question.
Detainee: That I resided at a Kandahar guesthouse.  This guest-
house, do you mean my house, was my house a guesthouse?
Tribunal President:  I would assume so.
Detainee: If it was my house then of course I was there.  But, if it
is another person’s guesthouse, then no.21
Some of the incriminating statements discussed in this passage
were made, unbeknownst to Abd al Malik, by Detainee #063 —
later identified in public as Mohammed al-Qahtani.  Here is what
T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism
Division of the FBI, wrote to Major General Donald J. Ryder about
al-Qahtani in July 2004:
In September or October of 2002 FBI agents observed that a
canine was used in an aggressive manner to intimidate detainee
[#063] and, in November 2002, FBI agents observed Detainee
[#063] after he had been subjected to intense isolation for over
three months.  During that time period, [#063] was totally iso-
lated (with the exception of occasional interrogations) in a cell
that was always flooded with light.  By late November, the de-
tainee was evidencing behavior consistent with extreme psycho-
logical trauma (talking to non-existent people, reporting
21 Summarized Detainee Statement at 2–3 (on file with the author).
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hearing voices, crouching in a corner of the cell covered with a
sheet for hours on end).  It is unknown to the FBI whether such
extended isolation was approved by DoD authorities.22
This is the same Guantánamo prisoner who was subjected to
extraordinary interrogation techniques—patently in contravention
of the Geneva Conventions—approved by officials at the CIA.23  A
classified document cataloging seven-weeks’ worth of al-Qahtani in-
terrogation sessions was leaked to TIME Magazine in the summer of
2005 and has been posted on the Internet.24  The document is
truly disturbing.  Al-Qahtani was subjected to a host of humilia-
tions: his personal space was invaded by a female; water was repeat-
edly poured over his head; photographs of 9/11 victims were
pinned to his clothes; and his access to a toilet was restricted.  He
was interrogated for twenty hours a day for nearly the entire seven
weeks — with a break allowed only for a brief period of hospitaliza-
tion after his heart rate fell to thirty-five beats per minute.25  None
of this evidence was made available to Abd al Malik’s CSRT panel.
When I presented it by letter to the Administrative Review Board—
which is kind of a “parole” hearing for unconvicted prisoners
where their “dangerousness” is assessed to determine if they may
be released from Guantánamo26—it was received with utter silence.
Abd al Malik remains in Guantánamo today.
How do we cure the procedural injustices that are so manifest
in these CSRT proceedings?  The obvious answer is through habeas
corpus hearings in the civilian courts, where the government must
come forth with competent evidence justifying the legality of our
clients’ detention.  Our demands are time-honored and fundamen-
tal:  a neutral judge, the assistance of counsel, access to the evi-
22 Letter from T.J. Harrington to Army Major General Donald J. Ryder 2 (July 14,
2004), http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4622_4624.pdf (detainee
number redacted in original).
23 The memorandum approving of enhanced interrogation techniques for Guan-
tánamo prisoners—including the infamous practice of waterboarding—was leaked to
ABC News in November 2005 by “former and current intelligence officers and super-
visors.” See Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques De-
scribed, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/
Investigation/story?id=1322866.
24 Interrogation Log of Detainee 063, TIME, (Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.time.
com/time/2006/log/log.pdf.
25 See Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME,
June 12, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1071284,00.
html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar.
26 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR ENEMY COMBAT-
ANTS IN THE CONTROL OF THE DEP’T OF DEF. AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, CUBA
(May 11, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.
pdf.
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dence being used against our clients, and an opportunity to
counter the government’s allegations with our own evidence.  After
Rasul v. Bush, such hearings seemed inevitable.27  But just months
after the Supreme Court stated definitively that federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo prisoners’ habeas cases, the gov-
ernment moved to dismiss all of our habeas cases en masse, claim-
ing that the Guantánamo prisoners have no constitutional rights
that might be vindicated via the Great Writ.  This is not the place to
rehash our arguments in opposition, so I will simply note that, in
January 2005, Senior District Judge Joyce Hens Green denied the
government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Guantánamo
prisoners do possess certain fundamental constitutional rights and
that habeas hearings were appropriate.28  The government ap-
pealed that decision on an interlocutory basis, and we were forced
to wait for more than two years for a decision on the appeal from
the D.C. Court of Appeals.
In February 2007, the Court of Appeals finally ruled.  Over a
dissent from Judge Janice Rogers, the panel dismissed the habeas
petitioners’ claims after determining that intervening legislation
from Congress had stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear the prisoners’ habeas claims.29  In doing so, the panel necessa-
rily ruled that the Guantánamo prisoners do not have a common-
law or constitutional right to habeas corpus; it was therefore unnec-
essary to determine whether the limited review of a prisoner’s “en-
emy combatant” status—provided by Congress in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 200530 and the Military Commissions Act of
200631—was an adequate and effective substitute for the men’s
habeas rights.32  Of course, we immediately filed a petition in the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which we hope will be
granted on an expedited basis.  If certiorari is denied, we will be
forced to begin the litigation almost anew, filing petitions in the
Court of Appeals challenging the constitutionality of the CSRT
hearings to which our clients were subjected.33
27 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481, 484 (2004) (holding that federal courts have
jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions by foreign nationals imprisoned at Guantá-
namo Bay Naval Base in Cuba).
28 In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005).
29 See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
30 Pub. L. No. 109–48, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
31 Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
32 See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (“substitution of a collateral rem-
edy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s deten-
tion” does not violate Suspension Clause).
33 On April 2, 2007, days after the instant symposium took place, the Supreme
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I understand the circumspection with which the courts have
proceeded.  Guantánamo raises profound issues of constitutional
concern that should not be lightly addressed without adequate de-
liberation.  Where a congressional fix seems to be on the horizon,
it is only to be expected that the courts will strive to delay making
binding constitutional pronouncements.  Moreover, our genera-
tion has been well-schooled in the virtues of judicial minimalism34
and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.35  But five years into
their detention without charge, trial, or the protections of the Ge-
neva conventions and three years after their habeas petitions were
originally filed, our clients are rightly outraged by the failure of the
courts to take definitive action.  I firmly believe that by failing to
rule on these habeas cases with expedition, our courts have abdi-
cated their judicial function.  Indeed, it is a definitional element of
habeas corpus that the Writ is to provide a speedy and effective rem-
edy illegal detention.36  Every day that the Guantanamo petitioners
remain imprisoned without a fair hearing in a court of law brings
Court denied our petition for certiorari, over the dissent of three Justices.  Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the denial of certiorari but issued a
“statement” indicating that he believed it was premature to address the “obvious im-
portance” of the constitutional questions before the Guantánamo prisoners had ex-
hausted the remedies provided by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act.
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).  However, while this piece was in pro-
duction, the Supreme Court reconsidered its denial of certiorari and agreed to hear
the case in 2007 Term.  Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (granting peti-
tion for rehearing, vacating earlier denial of certiorari, and granting petition for
certiorari).
34 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (Harvard Univ. Press 1999); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITU-
TION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (Princeton Univ. Press 1999); Antonin Scalia, Common-
Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton
Univ. Press 1997); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (Harvard Univ.
Press 1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW (The Free Press 1990);  Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial
Minimalism, 100 COLUM L. REV. 1454 (2000) (for an excellent analysis of recent schol-
arship advocating a “minimalist” approach).
35 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (where even a “serious doubt
of [a statute’s] constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring) (passing upon constitutional question should be last resort).
36 Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (writ of habeas corpus, “shaped to
guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy
instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a
person”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (habeas corpus “is perhaps the most
important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift
and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement”), overruled on
other grounds, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
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about an irremediable injury to our clients and represents an af-
front to the rule of law.
I try to explain our legal system to my clients, to convince
them that the President is not above the law and to assure them
that our courts, though sometimes slow, truly seek justice.  I also try
to keep their hope alive and instill confidence that, once we man-
age to get them hearings before neutral courts, their freedom will
likely be imminent.  But every time I go back to Guantánamo I am
forced to convey news of more and more delay.  Now, three years
after I first began working on their behalf, many of my clients have
lost faith in our courts and have concluded that American justice is
really just a sham.  Some of my clients have attempted suicide;
some are on hunger strike; and some now refuse to participate in a
legal system they conclude has abandoned them.  Justice may yet
come to my clients and the other prisoners at Guantánamo—but
standing here today, I must admit that justice still seems a long way
off.
